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This paper considers a developing nation that faces a foreign exchange shortage and hence
its demand for foreign goods is limited both by its income and its foreign exchange balance.
Availability of international credit relaxes the second constraint. We develop a simple model
of strategic interaction between lending institutions and ﬁrms, and show that the availability
of international credit at concessionary rates can leave the borrowing nation worse off than if
it had to borrow money at higher market rates. This ‘paradox of benevolence’ is then used to
motivate a discussion of policies pertaining to international lending and the Southern
government’s method of rationing out foreign exchange to the importers.
r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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There is a small literature that argues that the beneﬁts of international credit do
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country.1 The aim of this paper is to subject this claim to careful theoretical scrutiny.
What we ﬁnd is that, while this hypothesis need not always be true, there do exist
parametric conﬁgurations under which it is valid. This is interesting because of its
paradoxical nature. At ﬁrst sight it seems that the availability of credit (or, more
generally, availability of credit at better terms) cannot make the recipient, whether it
be an individual or a nation, worse off because the recipient has the option not to
take the credit or to pay a higher interest than what the donor demands (by, for
instance, burning money). However, such simple logic runs into difﬁculty, especially
in the domain of strategic international ﬁnance.
We construct a formal model and show that, when a nation buys goods from large
corporations with monopolistic power, the availability of cheaper credit may
actually leave the recipient worse off. In particular, a poor developing country that is
currently borrowing money from a proﬁt-maximizing international bank or ﬁnancial
institution may become worse off if some ‘benevolent’ organization steps in, in place
of the proﬁt-maximizing bank, and begins to lend hard currency at zero or a
subsidized interest rate. Since public foreign lending is usually motivated by altruism
and the need to ﬁll in for market failures (Eaton, 1989, p. 1308) it seems quite
surprising to ﬁnd that there are situations where the recipient nation does better
when it gets its foreign capital from private sources.
To see the logic, note that if a poor country has to borrow money from a proﬁt-
maximizing lender at an interest i and pay a price p to a manufacturer for the good,
then (assuming the exchange rate is 1) the effective price on the margin is ð1þ iÞp.
Here the lender and the manufacturer compete in an interesting manner with the
lender controlling i and the manufacturer controlling p. Now suppose that a
‘benevolent’ lender steps in and sets the interest rate equal to zero, which reduces the
effective price from ð1þ iÞp to p. The manufacturer takes advantage of this by
raising its price from p to p0. On one hand, this price rise results in a welfare loss,
since a part of the country’s purchase is ﬁnanced by its own foreign exchange. On the
other hand, for the other part of the purchase that is ﬁnanced by the lender, the
country is still beneﬁted from the benevolent lending because the effective price p0
turns out to be still lower than ð1þ iÞp. We demonstrate that the former
disadvantage of the benevolent lending is greater than the latter advantage of it
under a range of parameterization conditions.
In brief, this paper proposes a new game-theoretic framework for analyzing the
strategic interaction between lending institutions and producers, and demonstrates
the possibility of paradoxical reactions (which we call the ‘paradox of benevolence’).
In the process it draws attention to how we may want to reorganize international
lending, paying particular attention to the market structure that the recipient
country confronts, so as to ensure that the beneﬁts reach their intended target.1For works that either defend this proposition or debate it, see Winkler (1929), Hyson and Strout
(1968), Bhagwati (1970), Gwyne (1983), Taylor (1985), Darity and Horn (1988), Basu (1991), and
Deshpande (1999).
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In this section we present a number of real-world contexts to which our theoretical
framework is applicable, and explore the policy implications of our analysis, though
the latter is picked up once again in Section 6.
One country lending money to another or giving aid with an eye on enhancing its
own exports is not unusual at all. Many industrialized countries give loans to
developing countries with the explicit requirement that the latter then use these to
buy goods from the former (Eaton, 1989; Fleisig and Hill, 1984). Virtually all OECD
countries have special provisions for providing export credit. This is money given to
other nations speciﬁcally for those nations to buy goods from the donor nation.
Moreover, importantly, a lot of this credit is given at concessionary rates, and, in
particular, at lower than market interest rates. This is done, ostensibly, to help the
recipient nations. Sweden, for instance, has the Swedish Export Credit Corporation
or AB Svensk Exportkredit (SEK). This was established in 1962 ‘‘for the purpose of
ﬁnancing exports of Swedish capital goods and services on commercial terms’’
(OECD, 2001, Sweden p. 3). Up to 1978 SEK used to grant credit on strictly
commercial terms. Since then there has been a program of subsidized lending.
Subsidies are funded from Sweden’s Development Aid Budget. As OECD (2001,
Sweden p. 10) notes, ‘‘Concessionary credits are mainly tied to Swedish exports’’,
though this is not necessarily so.
In USA, the Trade and Development Agency (TDA), formerly known as the
Trade and Development Program (TDP), has two objectives—to give subsidized
credit to help developing and middle-income countries and to promote the export of
goods and services to those countries. In the US tied aid has legal authorization
because the Trade and Development Act, 1983, in particular, its sections 644 and
645, explicitly authorize the Eximbank and USAID to provide tied aid and credit to
other nations.
These are just two among many examples found in OECD (2001). There is reason
to believe that the subsidized international credit sector, which aims to promote
export and help the recipient country is substantial. As Fleisig and Hill (1984, pp.
322–323) noted, ‘‘Outstanding direct subsidized and export credits of the major
lending countries (Canada, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States)
amounted to $55 billion at the end of 1978. These lenders offered substantial
subsidies, charging interest rates between 7 and 8%, at the same time that private
lenders charged between 5 and 15%.’’
Under the requirement that the export credit should be used to import goods from
the donor nation, the loan-recipient countries may be forced to choose a seller from a
limited number of potential sellers. That is, the provision of export credit with such a
requirement could end up creating or at least bolstering the sellers’ market power.
The paradoxical result of our model suggests that some of these recipient countries
may have been better off if they were exposed to the private credit market with its
non-concessionary lending.
There are accounts galore of countries that have received subsidized international
credit but have adamantly remained basket cases. There are a number of reasons for
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diligently; there may have been corruption and leakage at the level of the
government. But, in addition, our model suggests that there may be another
previously unexplored reason why the beneﬁciaries may not have done well. This is
to do with an unholy alliance between subsidized credit and the market structure of
ﬁrms and banks that confront the borrowing country. The money may have leaked
out to international producers with market power. One implication of our model is
that, when an export credit is offered to a country at a concessionary rate, it should
be ensured that the recipient country uses the credit to import goods from
competitive markets.
Our model also yields important implications for the organization of international
lending by multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, that
give subsidized credit. The IMF, for instance, provides ﬁnancing to its member
countries under different types of credit arrangements (‘‘facilities’’). These include
regular facilities at market-related interest rates, and a concessionary facility for low-
income countries (the poverty reduction and growth facility, PRGF). PRGF
arrangements cover a three-year period, with repayments over 5.5–10 years at an
interest rate of 0.5%.2 See IMF (2001a) for further details on types of fund
arrangements offered by the IMF.
A number of IMF-supported programs (in particular, practically all concessionary
ﬁnancing arrangements) have included a variety of structural conditionalities.
Concerning trade-related conditionality, the IMF often requires trade liberalization
measured by the trade restrictiveness index that combines the average level of tariff
protection as well as the coverage of non-tariff barriers (IMF, 2001b). Our model
indicates that the IMF should also keep an eye on the structure of the markets from
which the borrower countries import goods. In particular, if a borrower country
imports goods from industries with substantial market power, it may be better off by
having to borrow from a non-concessionary facility rather than a concessionary
facility, and so careful investigation is needed regarding the type of lending
arrangement that is suitable.3
The model also highlights the crucial role of the mechanism through which the
limited foreign exchange is released to the importers in the borrower country by the
borrower government (or Central Bank). The paper suggests that the rules for
allocating the limited foreign reserves followed by the government can make a
crucial difference in determining what effect international credit or aid has on the
well-being of the recipient nation. Hence the model, despite its use of a rather
stylized framework, depicts theoretically the general idea explored empirically by
Burnside and Dollar (2000) on how the nature of governance in the borrowing2PRGF was established in 1999. The predecessors of the PRGF had been the structural adjustment
facility (SAF) and the enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF).
3There is now a lot of evidence from cross-country studies on how trade liberalization and greater
openness in general leads to the growth of income (see, for instance, Ben-David, 1993; Sachs and Warner,
1995; Frankel and Romer, 1999). What we show is that, if the trade liberalization and openness leads to a
more competitive trade environment as one may expect, then this may also increase the efﬁcacy of the
concessionary facility offered by the IMF.
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work to its advantage or not.4
As a ﬁnal point, we discuss an application of our theoretical framework to intra-
country rural credit markets. In rural regions of developing countries, peasants often
face short-term money shortage in the pre-harvest season. Hence, borrowing is
widespread in such times with repayment occurring after the harvest when the
peasant regains liquidity. According to a large-scale survey of contractual relation-
ships in rural India (see Bardhan, 1984, Chapter 9, for details), landlords often lend
money to their own share tenants, where the loans can be for many different
purposes – consumption to tide over the lean season or production purpose loans.
Interestingly, Bardhan reports that these loans can often be without interest. If such
a peasant faces a monopolistic product market from which he buys the goods that he
needs, then our theoretical framework suggests that the paradoxical result can
occur.5 That is, such a peasant could be better off if he were exposed to a proﬁt-
maximizing money lender rather than to a ‘benevolent’ money lender. In this
context, government subsidized credit to poor peasants may not be the panacea that
it is often made out to be.3. The model
In this model there is a developing country – henceforth South, and an
industrialized country – henceforth North. These countries have their own currencies
but for all inter-country trade and exchange the only acceptable currency is the
North’s currency. This is the ‘hard’ currency. We shall refer to the South’s currency
as the ‘soft’ currency.
The South, in our model, has a shortage of ‘hard currency’. This is so in the
sense that if it could buy more hard currency at the going exchange rate it would
do so and use it to buy more foreign goods. The fact of a country facing a shortage
of hard currency suggests some rigidity in the exchange rate. We treat the ex-
change rate as ﬁxed and, without loss of generality, we treat it as ﬁxed at 1. Although
one reason for making this assumption is to make the model tractable, we also feel
that this is not as strong an assumption as may appear at ﬁrst sight. The fact that
many Third World nations do face a shortage of hard currency, suggests that
exchange rates are at least partially rigid in reality. We suspect that there are innate
factors in the structure of international economic relations which cause this. How
else can one explain why, even after developing country governments go for a free
ﬂoat and allow the exchange rate to be market driven, shortages of hard currency
persist?4See also Collier (1997) and Hansen and Tarp (2001).
5It is plausible that poor peasants often buy goods from sellers with substantial market power. Bardhan
(1984) argues that highly personalized ties between transacting agents that are typically observed in
isolated rural villages often result in monopolistic power. See Bhaduri (1983) for a similar argument
regarding ‘personalized rural market’.
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country government. We treat the government not as a strategic agent, nimbly
maximizing some payoff, but as a somewhat mechanical bureaucracy which has
some rigid rules, to which it adheres. In particular, we model licensed importers in
the South, to which the government (or the Central Bank) allocates its limited
foreign exchange balance; and they are given the right to buy goods abroad and sell
them in the South. One reason why we treat the government as not a strategic agent
is for tractability; the model has a surfeit of strategic agents. However, we also
believe that this description is fairly realistic in the case of many developing and
transition economies. For instance, in the case of Pakistan and India, it ﬁts reality
quite well especially through the seventies and eighties.6
We shall in this paper focus on one good, which the South likes to consume but it
does not produce. The good is in fact produced by a ﬁrm based in the North, which
sells the good (not only in the North but also) in the South through the licensed
importers. The Northern ﬁrm produces the good at a constant marginal cost c, faces
no ﬁxed cost, and chooses the price p at which it sells to the South. Though in our
formal model we work with one such ﬁrm, our qualitative results would be
unchanged under n oligopolistic ﬁrms.
On the demand side we assume, without loss of generality, that the South has one
consumer, who is a price taker. Imagine ﬁrst that the consumer has free access to the
hard currency at the going exchange rate. In such a case let the consumer’s inverse
demand function for the good sold by the North be given by
p ¼ a bx, (1)
where a4c; b40, and p is the price of the product and x the amount demanded. This
will be called the unconstrained demand curve. Without a shortage in hard currency
and in the absence of licensed importers (that is, assuming that the consumers buy
directly from the Northern producers), standard monopoly analysis shows the
equilibrium price and quantity to be
p ¼ aþ c
2
and x ¼ a c
2b
.
This point is illustrated in Fig. 1 by the point E. Note that the total amount of hard
currency needed to buy the equilibrium amount of the good is given by
px ¼ ða2  c2Þ=4b.
We shall from here on consider the case in which the South’s foreign exchange
reserve R, though positive, is insufﬁcient for this point E to be attained. In other
words, we are making the following assumption.
Assumption 1.
0oRoða2  c2Þ=4b.6Writing in the very early nineties on Pakistan, Baysan (1992, p. 468) observed, ‘‘Distinct from import
bans and restrictions, value limits on individual licenses against cash for imports of machinery and
millwork have been (and still are being) maintained . . .. These ceilings . . . function as nontariff barriers . . .
and serve as a nonprice rationing mechanism for the allocation of foreign exchange.’’
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capture the monopoly rent associated with the unconstrained demand curve.
It is being assumed here that, what the South suffers from is not a problem of
insolvency but illiquidity. In other words, it expects to have adequate access to
foreign exchange in the future. The simplest way to make this formal is to suppose
that the South’s currency becomes convertible in the future. So in the future its
demand is not constrained by its foreign exchange reserves. We will assume that this
foreign-exchange constrained position lasts for one period (which can of course be
very long) and it is this one period that our model studies.
So the Southern government has a reserve of R units of hard currency. How does
the government use this? We will assume that the government sets a quota for each
of the mðX2Þ importers. That is, each importer is given the right to acquire foreign
exchange up to this quota limit by giving up an equivalent amount of soft currency.
With this foreign exchange the importers use the hard currency to buy goods from
the North which they then sell to the Southern consumers. We shall, for simplicity,
assume that all importers are treated identically, and so each importer has access to
R=m units of the hard currency. It will be assumed that the importers take the
international price of the product as given and constitute a Bertrand oligopoly in the
domestic market.
It will be shown later in Section 5 that, for the purpose of our analysis, such a
model works the same way as an alternative model in which the Southern
government gives consumers direct access to a ﬁxed amount of foreign exchange.
Given this mathematical equivalence, in what follows we proceed with our analysis
by supposing that the Southern government announces that the consumer can
acquire up to R units of hard currency. In other words, the amount of foreign good,
x, that the consumer buys must satisfy
xpR=p. (2)
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constraint) is given by x ¼ ða pÞ=b, and combining this with (2) we see that the
actual demand function of the South is given by
x ¼ min a p
b
;
R
p
 
. (3)
This is demonstrated by the thick line in Fig. 1.7
We now incorporate international lending into our model; we will consider the
following two cases:Case I.7If we we
who have a
liquid cash
consumer iThere is a non-proﬁt ‘international organization’ that lends hard currency
credit to the South at a subsidized interest rate.Case II. There is a proﬁt-maximizing international bank (based in the North) that
gives hard-currency credit to the South.We shall, throughout, assume, without loss of generality, that the interest rate
prevailing in the North is zero. The Southern consumer and government do not have
direct access to the Northern credit market, but the international organization and
the Northern bank have access to it. So to these latter agents the opportunity
(interest) cost of lending money to the South is zero. Given our focus on illiquidity
(rather than insolvency) problems faced by the South, we assume that the South
never defaults.
The analysis of Case I is straightforward. Let us suppose that the international
organization lends to the South at the opportunity cost interest, that is, an interest
rate of zero. Once South has access to such credit, the foreign exchange constraint of
R becomes immaterial. South’s demand for the product is given by Eq. (1) and the
equilibrium price and quantity are given by p and x, which are represented by
point E in Fig. 1.
Case II is the interesting case, and what we go on to show, later, is that the
Southern country may be better off in this case than under Case I. But ﬁrst we need
to depict the equilibrium that will arise in Case II.
Since the central issue in the analysis of Case II is the strategic interaction between
the ﬁrm and the bank, we derive the reaction functions (more precisely ‘implicit
reaction functions’) of the ﬁrm and the bank and then characterize Nash equilibria.
Let us start with the ﬁrm. Consider ﬁrst the case where R ¼ 0, that is, for whatever
the South buys from the North it has to ﬁrst borrow money from the bank.
In Fig. 2, aF is the South’s unconstrained demand curve (given by Eq. (1)).
Suppose the bank charges an interest rate of i. Then if the ﬁrm charges a price of p,
the effective price to the Southern consumer is ð1þ iÞp. Hence the effective demandre thinking of this as an intra-country, credit market problem, we could think of consumers
‘true’ demand curve (i.e., in the absence of any liquidity problems) given by (1) but have little
, maybe because this is the pre-harvest, lean season. If the liquid cash available with the
s given by R, then his effective demand function for the good in questions is given by (3).
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implies that the ﬁrm’s best response is to choose a price that is represented by the
midpoint of line segment a0H 0, shown by point E0. By considering different interest
rates, i, and plotting the mid-point that represents the ﬁrm’s best response for each i,
we obtain the ﬁrm’s best response curve. This is represented by the broken line
EE 0C. We call it the ﬁrm’s ‘implicit reaction function.’8 The reader should also
check that, if c were 0, the ﬁrm’s implicit reaction function would be a vertical line
from E down to the horizontal axis. The reason why we call this an ‘implicit’
reaction function is because, unlike in a conventional reaction function where the
two variables chosen by the two players are represented on the two axis, here the
interest rate i, chosen by the bank, is not represented on any axis, but is implicit in
the effective demand curve.
Now let us bring in the fact that R40, as shown in Fig. 3. If the interest rate, i,
charged by the bank is such that the effective demand curve is a0F , then the actual
demand curve (the one which takes into account the fact that up to R units, the
South does not need to borrow money) is given by the thick line, going through
points B and D. The ﬁrm’s implicit reaction function is EK 0 and point B, where EK
is a truncated segment of the EE 0C curve in Fig. 2. To see this, gradually increase
the value of i, starting from i ¼ 0. The ﬁrm’s best response is represented by point E
when i ¼ 0, and by point E0 (see Fig. 2) when i is positive but sufﬁciently small.
Then, as i rises E0 moves in the southwest direction. But before E0 reaches point K (in
Fig. 3, the ﬁrm’s best response point will jump to point B. Let us denote by K 0 the
point where the jump occurs. To see that this will happen, suppose that i is such that
the line, a0F , passes through point K in Fig. 3. Clearly, the ﬁrm is strictly better off8The mathematical properties of this function are spelled out in Anant et al. (1995).
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prices revenue is the same and the total cost is smaller at point B. Hence, there exists
point K 0, where the ﬁrm is indifferent between choosing point K 0 and point B.
Now we turn to the bank’s reaction function. First suppose that the ﬁrm has ﬁxed
a price, p, such that R=pXða pÞ=b holds. In this case, the South does not borrow
hard currency because the consumer’s demand given by the unconstrained demand
curve (i.e., p ¼ a bx) is feasible without borrowing any hard currency. Then, any
value of i is the bank’s best response, because the bank cannot make any proﬁts from
lending to the South, for all iX0.
Next suppose that the ﬁrm has ﬁxed a price, p, such that R=poða pÞ=b holds.
This condition means that, under the price, the consumer’s demand given by the
unconstrained demand curve is not feasible without borrowing hard currency
because the Southern government has only Rð40Þ units of hard currency.
Graphically, the price is strictly between the prices represented by point B and D
in Fig. 3. Given such price, the bank can make a proﬁt from lending hard currency to
the South, which is given by
pBðiÞ  i p
a pð1þ iÞ
b
 
 R
 
.
Graphically, the bank’s proﬁt is represented by area QRST in Fig. 4, where the ﬁrm
has ﬁxed a price at p ¼ p0 and the bank has chosen i represented by a0F . Given p0, the
bank chooses i so that the area QRST is maximized. The maximization implies that
ARTICLE IN PRESS
P
x F 
a/b
a
a’
p’
Q 
T Z 
B 
R S 
D
0 
Fig. 4.
K. Basu, H. Morita / European Economic Review 50 (2006) 1507–1528 1517the bank chooses i such that point T in Fig. 4 becomes the mid-point of QZ. Then,
for any given p0, the bank’s best response is to choose i such that corresponding a0F
line goes through the mid-point of QZ. Plotting such mid-points for different values
of p0, we obtain the broken line in Fig. 5. We call it the bank’s ‘implicit reaction
function.’
We are now ready to identify Nash equilibria. Superimpose the ﬁrm’s implicit
reaction function (EK 0 in Fig. 3) here. A Nash equilibrium is depicted by the point
of intersection of the two reaction functions, shown here by point N, where the
equilibrium price is given by p^ and the interest rate is the one implicit in the effective
demand curve a0F . This is an equilibrium in which a positive amount is borrowed.
We call this the N-equilibrium. Note that the N-equilibrium does not always exist
because the broken line does not necessarily intersect with EK 0. Note also that there
exists another Nash equilibrium, where the ﬁrm chooses the price that corresponds
to point B and the bank chooses a very high interest rate. This is an equilibrium in
which no lending occurs.4. The paradox of benevolence
We now demonstrate that the paradox of benevolence can happen in the N-
equilibrium. The aggregate welfare earned by the South in the N-equilibrium is
shown in Fig. 6 as the area STQp^a.
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K. Basu, H. Morita / European Economic Review 50 (2006) 1507–15281518Let us call this, in brief,Wp, where the p is a reminder that this is the welfare of the
South when the lender of credit is a proﬁt maximizer. Let us denote South’s
aggregate welfare when the Northern lender is benevolent (and charges no interest)
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model where
WboWp.
We will say that the ‘paradox of benevolence’ occurs if this inequality is true.
To prove this we need to ﬁrst depict Wb. Recall that when the South can freely
borrow from a benevolent lender (Case I, above) equilibrium occurs at point E and
the price of the Northern good is given by p. Hence Wb is the area of aEp. By
examining Fig. 6 it is clear that a priori we cannot say which is larger Wb or Wp.
Now, we are able to state the central result of the paper.
Proposition 1 (The paradox of benevolence). For any parameter values that satisfy
Assumption 1, there exists a value ~cð40Þ such that, holding all parameter values except
c fixed, the model exhibits the following property for all c 2 ½0; ~c:
The N-equilibrium exists and the paradox of benevolence occurs in that equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A. &
To understand the logic behind the result, let us compare the Northern ﬁrm’s
proﬁt maximizing behavior in Case I and Case II. LetMRðp; xÞ denote the Northern
ﬁrm’s marginal revenue when it sells x units of the good to the South at the price of
p. In Case I, the international organization lends to the South at the interest rate
i ¼ 0, and the Northern ﬁrm sells x units of the good at the price of p so that the
marginal revenue becomes equal to the marginal cost, i.e., MRðp;xÞ ¼ c. In Case
II, the proﬁt-maximizing international bank charges i40. Given the shortage of
hard currency in the South, the positive interest rate reduces the South’s willingness
of pay, which in turn reduces the Northern producer’s marginal revenue. In order to
sell x units to the South, the Northern producer can now charge only ½1=ð1þ iÞp,
where MRð½1=ð1þ iÞp; xÞ ¼ ½1=ð1þ iÞMRðp;xÞ.
First consider the case where the marginal cost c is zero. Then, in Case I, under the
Northern ﬁrm’s optimal choice (p;x) its marginal revenue MRðp;xÞ is zero. In
Case II, although the positive interest rate reduces the South’s willingness to pay, the
Northern ﬁrm’s marginal revenue when it sells x units is unaffected and still zero
(that is, MRð½1=ð1þ iÞp;xÞ ¼ ½1=ð1þ iÞMRðp; xÞ ¼ 0, if MRðp; xÞ ¼ 0).
Hence, the Northern ﬁrm’s optimal quantity is x in Case II as well as in Case I.
That is, the interest rate charged in Case II does not result in any additional quantity
distortion. On the other hand, the Northern ﬁrm must reduce its price from p to
½1=ð1þ iÞp to sell x units. And, given the positive amount of the South’s foreign
reserve ðR40Þ, the South gets some beneﬁt from the lower price charged by the
Northern ﬁrm. The result is that the South is strictly better off in Case II (i.e., the
paradox of benevolence occurs) when c ¼ 0.
Now let the marginal cost c be strictly positive, so that MRðp;xÞ ¼ c40 holds
under the Northern ﬁrm’s optimal choice ðp;xÞ in Case I. In Case II, the
South’s lower willingness to pay now implies that the Northern ﬁrm’s marginal
revenue when it sells x units is strictly below the marginal cost c (that is,
MRð½1=ð1þ iÞp; xÞ ¼ ½1=ð1þ iÞMRðp;xÞocÞ. This results in an additional
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x^) is now strictly less than x. However, when the marginal cost c is small, the degree
of this distortion is small. Then, this negative impact on the South’s welfare is more
than offset by the beneﬁt of the lower price, and hence the South is strictly better off
in Case II when c is small enough. This is what the Proposition states.
The result can also be understood graphically. First let c ¼ 0. Then, as we have
already seen, the ﬁrm’s implicit reaction function is a vertical line from E. Hence, as
shown in Fig. 7, the N-equilibrium point, N, is now vertically below E. Since the
Northern ﬁrm’s optimal quantity is x in Case II as well as in Case I, the South can
capture area aEp (which is the South’s consumer surplus in Case I) as a part of its
consumer surplus in Case II. In addition, due to the lower price charged by the ﬁrm,
the South also captures area TQp^p as its consumer surplus. The result is that the
South’s consumer surplus in Case II, represented by area ETQp^a, is greater than its
consumer surplus in Case I, represented by area Epa. Now let c40. Then, as
shown in Fig. 6, the N-equilibrium point, N, is not vertically below E anymore, and
the ﬁrm’s optimal quantity is x^, where x^ox. This additional quantity distortion in
Case II reduces the South’s consumer surplus. However, if c is relatively small, area
SERT is smaller than area RQp^p, which implies that the South is still better off in
Case II than in Case I.
We conducted numerical simulations to compute the zones of paradox in the
ðR; cÞ-space, in particular, a space in which the horizontal axis represents R and thepˆ
p*
N 
K
T E* (also S)
Q 
a
B 
D 
p
0 F x
Fig. 7.
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Table 1
Numerical examples for the paradox of benevolence (The value of cmax when a ¼ 10)
R b ¼ 0:4 b ¼ 0:5
5 0.94 1.22
10 2.23 3.22
15 7.00 6.29
20 6.06 5.16
25 5.16 4.16
30 4.35 3.31
35 3.63 2.57
40 3.00 1.91
45 2.44 1.23
50 1.91 —
55 1.37 —
60 0.73 —
65 — —
K. Basu, H. Morita / European Economic Review 50 (2006) 1507–1528 1521vertical axis represents c. For each value of R we have computed the maximum value
of c, denoted cmax, such that the paradox occurs for all non-negative values of c less
than cmax. The computation is made for the case where a ¼ 10 and b ¼ 0:4 or 0.5 and
the results are displayed in Table 1. The table tells that, for instance, with b ¼ 0:4, we
have cmax ¼ 2:23, 6.06, or 3.00, when R ¼ 10, 20, or 40, respectively. Namely, the
Paradox of Benevolence occurs for all c 2 ½0; 6:06 when a ¼ 10; b ¼ 0:4 and R ¼ 20.
Note that coa ð¼ 10 in these examplesÞ must hold for the Northern ﬁrm to sell a
positive amount of goods to the South. The numerical examples therefore seem to
indicate that the paradox of benevolence occurs in non-trivial ranges of parameter
values.
It is interesting to note the table exhibits an ‘‘inverted-U’’ shape in the ðR; cÞ-space.
That is, holding other parameter values ﬁxed, the value of cmax is increasing in R
when the value of R is relatively small, and it is decreasing in R when the value of R is
relatively large. Although we have worked out a number of examples and identiﬁed
this property in all of them, we have been unable to prove that this is the general
property.5. Competition among licensed importers
In Section 3 we began with the realistic assumption that, in the South, the
government gives some designated importers the right to acquire hard currency from
the central bank in order to import goods for domestic sale. We then pointed out
that, if these importers took the international price, p, of the good and the interest
rate, i, as given, and chose the domestic sale price (that is, they played a Bertrand
game), we could ignore these importers for the purpose of our analysis. Given this,
we derived our result under the assumption that government allocated foreign
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section we show that we can indeed ignore the importers in order to derive our
results.
As before, the Southern demand for the Northern good is given by
x ¼ a r
b
,
where r is the price that the consumers have to pay. There are now m identical
importers. They can buy the good (subject to having the requisite foreign exchange)
from a Northern producer at a price, p, chosen by the Northern producer. It is
assumed that the Southern importers take this price as given. Each of these importers
is given access to R=m units of foreign exchange by the Southern government. If they
want more foreign exchange they have to borrow this from a Northern bank at an
interest rate of i. Hence, if an importer wants to buy x units of this good from the
North it has to incur a total cost, TCðxÞ, given by
TCðxÞ ¼
px if pxpR
m
;
R
m
þ ð1þ iÞp x R
mp
 
if px4
R
m
:
8><
>:
(4)
Now, each of these m importers have to choose a price at which it offers to sell the
product to the Southern consumers. If ri denotes the price offered by importer i, then
we may denote the strategy n-tuple of the m importers by
ðr1; . . . ; rmÞ.
The proﬁt earned by importer i may then be denoted by piðr1; . . . ; rmÞ.
Our aim is to characterize the Nash equilibrium (Bertrand equilibrium in this case)
of this game. We will in particular be interested in the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
In other words, we deﬁne r to be an ‘equilibrium’ if, for all i ¼ 1; . . . ;m,
piðr; . . . ; rÞXpiðr; . . . ; ri; . . . ; rÞ, for all ri.
Fortunately, to characterize such an equilibrium we do not need to fully
characterize the pi function. We will here make the following reasonable
assumptions. If every importer charges the same price r, then each importer faces
a demand of ða rÞ=bm. If all importers, excepting importer i, charge r and importer
i charges riðarÞ, then the consumers respond as follows. If rior, importer i faces a
demand equal to ða riÞ=b. All consumers who fail to buy from i, direct their
demand at price r to the other importers. If ri4r, all consumers go to importers
other than i. Only those with unmet demand turn to i. These are fairly usual
assumptions; a formal statement of these occur in Basu (1993).
Let us now suppose that the ﬁrm has ﬁxed a price, p, such that R=poða pÞ=b
holds. Also suppose that the bank has ﬁxed an interest rate, i, such that R=poða
pð1þ iÞÞ=b holds. This condition means that, if government allocated foreign
exchange directly to the consumers, then the consumers’ demand given by the
unconstrained demand curve is not feasible without borrowing hard currency and so
they borrow a positive amount of hard currency from the bank. Under such p and i,
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K. Basu, H. Morita / European Economic Review 50 (2006) 1507–1528 1523the horizontal summation of all importers’ marginal cost functions (derived from
(4)) is the thick line shown in Fig. 8. It is easy to show that in this case r ¼ ð1þ iÞp is
an equilibrium. That is, if each importer charges r then no one can do better by
deviating. To see this note that when everybody charges ð1þ iÞp, the proﬁt earned by
each importer is given by iR=mp. Clearly by undercutting this price, an importer can
only do worse. If, on the other hand, an importer charges ri4ð1þ iÞp, no one will
buy from him. Hence, his proﬁt will drop to zero.
The analysis in the previous paragraph indicates that, for any p and i that satisfy
the conditions described above, the proﬁts of the ﬁrm and the bank are identical with
or without the designated importers. Also, consumers face the same marginal price
and demand the same amount of the good in the two cases. A similar equivalence
can be shown for other combinations of p and i. Since we focus on the welfare
consequences of the strategic interaction between the ﬁrm and the bank, this
equivalence allows us to ignore the importers in our analysis.6. Policy implications
The model and the results described in this paper have important policy
implications. First, it cautions aid donor agencies not to presume that subsidized
credit, given to a Third World nation, necessarily beneﬁts the recipient relative to the
case in which credit is made available by a proﬁt-maximizing bank or ﬁnancial
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make the recipient nation worse off. However, we have shown that, depending on the
structure of the import market, the advantages of subsidized credit may ﬂow into
the hands of corporations that sell goods to the recipient nations. In such a situation
the donor agency has to think of ways, other than subsidized credit, for reaching
beneﬁt to nations. The classical literature on aid-tying used to be concerned with this
question. What we have shown in this paper, however, is that the ﬂow-back of
beneﬁt to the North can occur even when aid is not tied, but depending on the
market structure of imports and the strategic position of the donor.
In trying to reach out to poor nations, most international organizations use the
method of lowering interest rates. The IMF uses this for the most indebted and poor
nations, while combining the generous loan terms with ‘conditionalities’, which
pertain to macroeconomic policies such as the need to keep the ﬁscal deﬁcit under
control and money supply growth in check. What this paper alerts us to is the fact
that such policies may not be enough to plug the holes through which the beneﬁts of
cheap credit get frittered away. The ‘market structure’ of trade may be the main
route through which the immiserization occurs. Hence, before lending at
concessional rates, it is worth examining and advising recipient governments on
the channels and structure of trade and methods of releasing limited foreign
exchange reserves.
The model suggests (though we have not really gone into this) that there may be
advantages to the South of giving the import rights to a single agent. This would
empower the importers vis-a`-vis the Northern manufacturer and may end up
beneﬁting the Southern consumer. Secondly, the Southern government may stand to
gain by being more pro-active in the foreign exchange market. Releasing the foreign
exchange as quotas to different agents may not be a good idea.
Let us take up the ﬁrst point ﬁrst. In our model the Southern importers do poorly
because they compete against one another both in the product market and the
international credit market. If they could behave collusively, they could exercise
market power. However, collusive behavior is difﬁcult to sustain on its own—a point
made persuasively in the context of international borrowing by governments by
Fernandez and Glazer (1990). However, in our model since the borrowers are
agencies within a nation, the government can enable them to exercise market power.
The system of ‘canalized’ imports used by some nations, for instance, India, could
have potentially played this role. In practice, canalized imports have been inefﬁcient
and bureaucratically cumbersome. Its potential has not been understood, let alone
realized.
Let us now turn to the second subject of how to ration the limited foreign exchange
reserve. The method analyzed in this paper—namely, one where the foreign
exchange is rationed out to the importers—is not the only one. The government
could (and they often do) place quantity restrictions on the amount each importer
may import. The analysis of this is not trivial since, while each importer will of
course take the quantity ration as given, the government should be modeled as
choosing that quantity ration, given which the total import value equals the amount
of foreign exchange the government has (or wants to release). There can be other
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foreign exchange released to an importer could depend on the terms of trade. Each
such ration will change the market outcome and the total beneﬁt generated to the
South and may even avert the paradox of benevolence. In the future it will be worth
examining formally the welfare effects of different systems of releasing limited
foreign exchange and for the Southern government to choose a system consciously to
maximize the welfare of its consumers.Acknowledgements
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Associate Editor.Appendix AProof of the Proposition. We ﬁrst analyze the ﬁrm’s best response given iðX0) chosen
by the bank.
First consider i that satisﬁes
iX
a2  4bR
4bR
. (A.1)
Under (A.1), the South does not borrow any hard currency for any p chosen by the
Northern ﬁrm. To see this, note that (A.1) is equivalent to ‘RXp½a ð1þ iÞp=b
holds for all p.’ Given such i, the ﬁrm chooses p such that the South spends R units of
hard currency to purchase the good; namely it chooses p such that p½ða pÞ=b ¼ R
holds. Hence, the ﬁrm’s best response is given by
p ¼ aþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a2  4bR
p
2
 pB. (A.2)
Any ðp; iÞ such that p ¼ pB and iXða2  4bRÞ=4bR is a Nash equilibrium.
Graphically, in this Nash equilibrium the ﬁrm chooses the price that corresponds
to point B in Fig. 3 and the bank chooses high enough i so that a0F does not intersect
the rectangular hyperbola twice. In this equilibrium (we call it B-equilibrium), the
bank’s proﬁt is zero and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is given by
ðpB  cÞða pBÞ
b
 pB. (A.3)
Next consider i that satisﬁes
io a
2  4bR
4bR
. (A.4)
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It charges the price given by (A.5) and the quantity demanded is given by (A.6):
p ¼ aþ ð1þ iÞc
2ð1þ iÞ  ~p, (A.5)
x ¼ a ð1þ iÞc
2b
 ~x. (A.6)
Note that the Northern ﬁrm can earn pB by choosing p ¼ pB regardless the value of i
chosen by the bank. Then, given i, the ﬁrm chooses ~p if and only if ~p  ð ~p cÞ ~xXpB.
Hence the Northern ﬁrm’s reaction function is given by
pðiÞ ¼
aþ ð1þ iÞc
2ð1þ iÞ  ~p if ~pXp
B;
aþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a2  4bR
p
2
 pB otherwise:
8>><
>>:
(A.7)
Next we analyze the bank’s best response given that the ﬁrm chooses p that
satisﬁes
p½ða pÞ=b4R. (A.8)
Given such price, the demand given by the unconstrained demand schedule (which is
p ¼ a bx) is not feasible unless the bank sets i ¼ 0. The bank chooses i that
maximizes its proﬁt given by
PðiÞ  i p a pð1þ iÞ
b
 
 R
 
. (A.9)
Note that, given (A.8), the bank can choose i40 such that PðiÞ40. The standard
maximization exercise then implies that the bank’s best response is given by
iðpÞ ¼ pa p
2  bR
2p2
. (A.10)
Now we characterize a Nash equilibrium in which the bank lends a strictly positive
amount of hard currency to the South. Insert (A.10) into (A.5), and we obtain
f ðpÞ  2p3  cp2  ð2bRþ acÞpþ bcR ¼ 0. (A.11)
Note that f ð0Þ ¼ bcRX0 and f ðcÞ ¼ c2ðc aÞ  bcRp0. This means that (A.11) has
exactly one root that is strictly greater than c. We denote the root by p. If there
exists a Nash equilibrium in which the bank lends a strictly positive amount of hard
currency to the South, such equilibrium is characterized by ðp; iÞ ¼ ðp; iðpÞÞ. This
constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if ðp; iÞ ¼ ðp; iðpÞÞ satisﬁes
~pXpB and (A.8); or equivalently if (A.12) and (A.13) hold:
½a ð1þ iðpÞÞc2
4bð1þ iðpÞÞ XR
cða
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a2  4bR
p
Þ
2b
, (A.12)
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Note that p is continuous in c, which implies that iðpÞ is also continuous in c.
Let c ¼ 0. Then f ðpÞ ¼ 2p3  2bRp, and so p ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bR
p
and iðpÞ ¼
ða
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bR
p
 2bRÞ=2bR. We ﬁnd that, when c ¼ 0, (A.12) is equivalent to aX2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bR
p
and (A.13) is equivalent to a42
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bR
p
. Note that Assumption 1 implies a42
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bR
p
holds when c ¼ 0, and that both p and iðpÞ are continuous in c. This implies that
there exists cð40Þ such that both (A.12) and (A.13) hold for all c 2 ½0; c.
Next, we assume c 2 ½0; c, and let Wp denote South’s aggregate welfare in the
Nash equilibrium represented by ðp; iðpÞÞ. As stated in the text, the social welfare is
represented by the area STQp^a in Fig. 6, which is given by
Wp ¼ ð1=2Þ½a ð1þ iðpÞÞpx þ iðpÞR, (A.14)
where x  ða ð1þ iðpÞÞpÞ=b. When c ¼ 0, we have
Wp ¼ a
2
8b
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bR
p
ða 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bR
p
Þ
2b
4Wb ¼ a
2
8b
, (A.15)
where strict inequality holds because a42
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bR
p
by Assumption 1. Note that p; iðpÞ
and x are all continuous in c. This implies that there exists c40 such that
Wp4Wb holds for all c 2 ½0; c. Finally, let ~c Min½c; c, and we obtain the
desired result. &References
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